People v. Sanchez by Traynor, Roger J.
University of California, Hastings College of the Law
UC Hastings Scholarship Repository




Follow this and additional works at: http://repository.uchastings.edu/traynor_opinions
This Opinion is brought to you for free and open access by the The Honorable Roger J. Traynor Collection at UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Opinions by an authorized administrator of UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. For more information, please
contact marcusc@uchastings.edu.
Recommended Citation
Roger J. Traynor, People v. Sanchez 21 Cal.2d 466 (1942).
Available at: http://repository.uchastings.edu/traynor_opinions/91
.- t 
466 PEOPLE V. SANCHEZ [210.2d· 
. Smith v~ Industrial A.cc. Com., supra.) The essential pre-
requisite to compensation is that the danger from which the 
injury results be one to which he is exposed as an employee 
in his pal't,icular employment. This requirement is met when, 
as an employee and solely by reason of his relationship as 
such. to his employer, he enters a vehicle regularly provided 
by his employer for the purpose of transporting him. to or 
. from the place of employment. (Dominguez v. Pendola, 
supra.) 
The award is affirmed. 
. Gibson, O.J., Shenk, J., Ourtis, J., Edmonds, J., Carter, 
J., and Spence, J. pro tem., concurred. . 
[Crim. No. 4431. In Bank. Dec. 31, 1942.] 
THE PEOPLE, ,Respondent, v. JOHN SANCHEZ at -a!., 
,Defendants; ANGELO JOHN PORRELLO, Appellant. 
[11 Evid~nce-Judic~al Notice-Courts-Juvenile Courts.-A re-
viewing court may take judicial, notice of a superior court's 
designation of a department thereof to sit as a juvenile court. 
(Code Civ.Proc., § 1875, subd.3.) 
[2] Crim,inalLaw-Appeal-Presumptions-Transfer of Cause.-
In; theabsexice of a showing in' the record to the contrary, 
, where a minor defendant was sentenced on his plea of guilty 
~ollowing a transfer of the cause to the department designatq61 
as a Juvenile court, it. will be presumed that the juvenile court 
:remanded the cause to the criminal department and that it 
had 'power to accept defendant's plea of guilty. 
[8] Id;-Revlew-On Appeals from Orders-Refusal to Vacate.-
On 'appeal from. an' order denying a motion' to vacate a judg-
ment, the reviewing court may not review alleged error in the 
trial court's recessing as .acriminal court and reconvening as 
a juvenile ·court instead of transferring the case to the juve-
nile court department, or in declaring the defendant a ward 
of the juvenile court after he had been presumably remanded 
[1] See 10 Oal.Jur. 727; 20 Am.Jur. 101. 
McK. Dig. References: [1] Evidence, § 67; [2] Criminal Law, 
,§1276; [3] Criminal Law, § 1263a; [4] Courts, § 159; [5] De-
linquent Children, §19. 
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to the superior court for prosecution. Such errors may be 
reviewed only on a direct appeal from the order. 
[4] Courts-Superior Court-Departments.-Where defendant is 
declared a ward of a juvenile court, no other department of 
the superior court acting in a general capacity has jurisdic-
tional authority to act in the matter, the jurisdiction of the 
juvenile court being exclusive . 
[5] Delinquent Children-Suspension of Criminal Proceedings-
Remand.-Where a defendant has been declared a ward of 
the juvenile court, the superior court cannot perform in a 
single capacity functions as a juvenile court and as a superior 
court acting under the general law, and by a single formal order 
vacate the commitment to a house of correction and sentence 
the defendant to the state penitentiary. Such order is void and 
should be set aside on motion. . 
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los 
.Angeles Oounty refusing to set aside a judgment. Benjami:p. 
J. Scheinman, Judge. Reversed. 
Morris Lavine for Appellant. 
Earl Warren, Attorney General, and Alberta Belford, 
Deputy Attorney General, for Respondent. 
TRAYNOR, J.-On March 4, 1941, an information was 
filed by the District Attorney of Los Angeles County against 
. .defen~ant Angelo John Porrello Q,nd two others accusing 
them III counts one and two of the crime of robbery, and of 
.-attempted robbery in count three. Defendant, a seventeen-
year-old boy, was arraigned in Department 41 of the Superior 
Court of Los Angeles County and pleaded not guilty to all 
courits of the information. Trial of the action was set for 
April 16, 1941, and the case transferred to Department '44. 
'On the day of the trial the judge of Department 44 trans-
ferred the case to Department 39, the department of the 
Superior Court of Los Angeles County designated to hold 
sessions as a juvenile court. The transcript gives no indica-
tion of' the proceedings in Department 39, but shows that on 
the following day defendant again appeared in Department 
44, withdrew his plea of "not guilty" to count one, pleaded 
[4] See 7 Cal.Jur. 681; 14 ·Cal.Jur. 136; 31 Am.Jur. 798. 







468 PEOPLE 'I). SANCHEZ [210.2d 
guilty to the charge and admitted being armed with a deadly 
weapon at the time the offense was committed. The court 
thereupon found the crime to be robbery in the first degree 
and granted defendant permission to file an application for 
probation. The cause was continued to May 7th, and when 
defendant appeared on that day the court recessed as acrim-
inal court and reconvened as a juvenile court. It then ordered 
proceedings as to count one of the information suspended. 
Pursuant to section 834 and 835 of the WeHare and Insti-
tutions Code it declared defendant a ward of the juvenile 
court under section 700 (M) of that code and ordered him 
committed to the' Preston School of Industry for the period 
of his minority. There it appeared that he was suffering from 
an advanced rheumatic heart disease, and the reports of the 
probation officer and letters in the record indicate that he was 
confined to bed with no prospect of improvement. The super-
intendent of the school repeatedly requested that defendant 
be returned to the court, and several months after defendant's 
commitment the Director of Institutions filed an affidavit that 
owing to physical disability defendant was unfit to profit by 
the training program of the school and that'it was inadvisable 
to retain him there longer, and directed his return to the 
Superior Court of Los Angeles County. Upon the recom-
mendation of the probation officer, the judge presiding in 
Department 41 of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, 
on August 12, 1941, vacated and set aside the order commit-
ting defendant to Preston, ordered him returned to the court 
for further consideration, and directe<i that the cause be 
placed on the calendar of Department 44 for August 20th. 
At the end of the supplemental report of the,probation officer 
filed on August 12th appears the following: 
, "August 12 1941 
"The above recommendation is approved, and so ordered 
(lB. J. Scheinman 
"Judge of the Superior Court" 
No other written order of that date appears in the record. 
On August 20th the minute entry for Department 44 states 
that the judge of that department transferred,' the cause to 
Department 41 foJ' disposition, but it does not show that he 
acted as a juvenile court. The minute entry for Depa~tment 
41 for the same day indicates that defendant appeared in that 
, department and that his case was continued. On September 
" 
" 
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11th the court still acting in Department 41, pronounced' 
judgment upo~ defendant and sentenc¢d ~,to, the Stllte 
'prison. There appears in the ,l'ecord a 'f?rmal ~1idgment dat~d 
September 11, 1941, vacating and, settllig aSide th¢ .com~llt. 
ment to the Preston School' of Industry and Qrdermg that 
defendant be punished by, imprisonment ~t.he ~tate prison 
for the term prescribed by law and be, deliverEJd mto the cus-
tody of the warden of the state prison at San Q1i~Ii.tin. TheJ:,e~ 
after, on December 17th, defendant made a' motlo~'to vaca~e 
and set aside this judgment upon the grounds that It was VOid 
and in violation ot his constitutional rights. This motion was 
denied and defendant has appealed. ' ' ' 
It is contended that the superior court had no jurisdiction 
to make'the original order committing <.lefendant to Preston~ 
on the ground that under the Juvenile Court Law the court 
had to transfer the case to the juvenile'court department and 
could not proceed unless the juvenile court jud~e remanded 
the case to the criminal department of the superior court ,for 
further proceedings. There is no doubt that defendant came 
within the jurisdiction of the juvenilecourt~ (WeH, & Inst: 
Code, §§ 700, (M), 825, 826, 833.) [1], It is not ,denied that 
Department 39 of the Superior Court of Los A~ge!e~ C?U~ty 
was designated to sit as a juvenile' court; and JudiCIal not~ce 
may be taken of this fact. (Cal. Code Civ:. Proc., § 1875 (3); 
see 10 Cal.Jur. 727; Varcoe v. Lee, 180 Cal. 33S, 344" ~181 
P. 223].) [2] The record does nots1),ow the proceedings 
before this department, nor does it indic~te. an:r rem~ild of, 
the case from the juvenile court to the cnlIlmal department 
of'the superior court. Such pI:oceedings, however, are not 
part of the transcript on appeal, and error ,caIiilot be pre-
sumed from their absence. (People v. Wo~ff, 182 CaL· 7~8 
[190 P. 22].) If defendant intendedto rely,upon error In 
the proceedings before the juvenile court or upon the c~n~ 
tention that he was not properly remanded to the supenor 
court he should have made such proceedings a part o~ the 
record. (People v. Wolff, supra;) In the abSeIi.ceo~,a show-
ing to the contrary, it is presume'd that the proceedmgs were, 
regular (In re Tassey, 81 Cal.App; 287, ,290 ,[253 P'94~1) 
and that the court had the power to allow defendant to With-
draw his plea of "not guilty!' to count one of the informa-
tion and to accept his plea of "guilty.", , , ,'. ,.-
[3] The question arises as to the power of~h~ supenor 
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and reconvene as a juvenile court. The court declared in the 
order that it was proceeding under sections 834 and 835 of 
the V! eHare and. Institutions Code. These sections refer only 
to mInors over eIghteen, but the order recites that the defen-
dant is "a; bo~ of ~he age of seventeen years, having duly 
pleaded gUIlty In thIS Court of the crime of Robbery . . . " 
The case thus comes within the Juvenile Court Law. (Welf, 
& Inst. Code, § 833.) The power of the court to make the 
order turns upon the facts stated rather than on the refer-
ence to certain sections of the act. (See In re Spiers, 32 
Cal.App.2d 124, 128 [89- P.2d 456].) The contention is ad-
vance? that .since the Juvenile Court Law provides that in 
cour~tIes havIng more than one judge of the superior court, 
the Judges shall annually designate one or more of their num~ 
ber to he~~ all cases u~der the law (Welf. & Inst. Code, §572), 
the pr~vIsIons of sectIon 833 allowing the court to recess as 
a crIm~nal court and' ,reconvene as a juvenile court do not 
a:pply In su.ch counties. The designation of a separate juve-
nile c~urt IS intended to expedite the work of the courts, 
bu~ faIlure t? tra~sfer the case to the department specifically 
assIgned to Juvemle court work is not a jurisdictional error. 
(Pe~ple~. Barber~, 78 Cal.App. 277, 279 [248 P. 304J.) In 
~akI~g Its order In the present case the court acted as a 
Juvemle cou~, and if the defendant wished to predicate errOr 
upon the faIlure to transfer the case to the juvenile, court 
departme~.t he should have done so by an appeal from that 
order. LIkewise, an objection that it was improper to declare 
defendant a ward of the juvenile court after he hadpresum-
ably once been rem.anded by the juvenile cOurt to the superior 
court for prosecutIOn under the general law could be raised 
only upon a directapp.e~l from the ~rder. The present appeal 
conc~rns onl! the valIdIty of the Judgment vacating defen': 
da~t s commItment to Preston and sentencing him to the state 
prISon, ~nd only error rendering that judgment void may now 
be, consIdered .. ~or the purposes of this appeal, therefore, 
the. order commIttIng defendant to Preston must be considered 
valId. 
T4~;rh~ ~udgment, however, is void for other reasons. 
Th~ JurIsdIctIOn of the, juvenile court over a ward continues 
untIl he becomes twenty-one or until the court is satisfied that 
he has reformed or that further supervision under the law is 
unnecessary o~ inadvis~ble. (WeH. & Inst.C6de, § 750~) It 
may at any tIme modIfy or set aside its orders concerning 
Dec. 1942] 
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him. {Welf. & Inst. Code, § 745; People v. De F'ehr, 81 
CaLApp. 562, 574 [254 P. 5881.) When defendant was 
declared a ward of the juvenile court, he became subject to 
its continuing jurisdiction. Whatever power the superior 
court had over him was thereby vested in the juvenile court, 
and until the latter remanded his case for disposition under 
thc general law no other department of the superior court 
acting in a general capacity had the jurisdictional authority 
to act upon the matter. (Williams v. Superior Court, 14 
Cal.2d 656, 662 [96 P.2d 334]; Rappaport v.SuperiorOiJurt, 
39 Cal.App.2d 15 [102 P.2d526] ; 7 Cal.Jur. 681.) When 
one department is exercising the jurisdiction vested in the 
superior court of that county, the other departments are as 
distinct from it as from other superior courts. (Williamsv. 
Superior Court, supra.) Defendan:t's case was pending ,before 
the juvenile court and its jurisdiction was therefore, exclusive. 
Confusion would result fr.om conflicting adjudications upon 
the same subject matter by different departments Of the same, 
court. (Williams v. Superior Court, supra.) Moreover, the 
purposes ,of theJ uvenile Court Law would be defeated i~ 
every department of the court acting' under the general law., 
COUld, encroach ul'on the jurisdiction of the juvenile, cou~., 
(See Welf. & Inst. Code, § 551; In re Daedler, 194 Cal. 320' 
[228 P. 467] ; 14 Cal.Jur. 136-138.) . ' 
The Juvenile Court Law requires thattheE!uperior court 
exercise the additional jurisdiction thereunderi,n:a manner" 
distinct from its regular mode of operation (see ,Peoplify;. 
Superior Court, 104 Cal.App; 276,,281-282 [285 P. 871]), 
and when it doeS so it becomes the "juvenile court."· (Welf: 
'& Inst. Code, § 571.) In counties having more' tran 'One 
superior court judge, one or more of their 'nuinbershall::~e, 
designated annually to hear cases coming within the juvenile 
court law (Welf. & Inst. Code, §§ 572, 833), and ~ll c~es 
under the law must be heard at a specjal or separate sessjon 
'of the court where no other matters shall be heard; (W~lf . 
. & Inst. 'Code, § 573.) All orders committing or, recommitting . 
a ward of the juvenile court must be in writingaiidsigned 
by the judge of the juvenile court. (Welf. & Inst. Co~e, 
§ 735.) It is inconsistent with the mode of opefoation required 
by the act to allow other departments of th,e court' a~tin~: 
under the general authority of superior courts to act upon 
'cases within the Juvenile Court Law over which the juv~Il»e 
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. ~5]. Respond~nt, "',hile acknowledging, the contin,l1ing jur-
ISdIctIOn of the Juvenile {lOJll't; contends that the' trial court 
sitting as a ju~enil~ court had jurisdiction to 'vacatehs, order 
committing <;1.ef,endimt to i>,rest(jD. a~d to remaridlllin to the' 
superior court for sentence. lt cannot be assum~d,however 
that the trial court sat as a juvenile court when it vacated 
the order of comniitment or that the juvenile court reIrian.ded 
defendant to th'e superior court fQr sentence'; thire(Jor~i' in 
the instant case shows otllerwise on its face. The full minute 
entries and the written orders appearing in the recorCiare 
devoi,d of any in4icatiori that thedepartIneD.t ,m which the 
order' vacating defendant's cpminitment was made ,was ,the' 
juvenile court department, or tllat the judge who made' the 
order was the juvenile . court judge, or that in mak~:n:g" the 
order the court was actIng as a juvenile court. The formaL 
order ,:acati~g defendant's com.mitme~t arid thejii<;1.~ent 
sentencIng hIm to S~n Queritin under the general'la:ware' 
?oth p'art of the ~ame jud~ent decreed bythe'dou:rt'~cting' 
In a SIngle capaCIty, shovvIng conclusively that- the case was 
never reml:j,nded to the superior court by the -Juvenile' court. 
U~der ~he Juvenile Court Law the SUperior courtacting,a~, 
a Ju~emle co~rt should have ent~rec:l ~n order vacati~g defen~ 
dant s commItment and remanding hIm to the ~uperior court. 
for further proceedings to enable the superior' court acting 
under the general law to impose sentence upon him. The, 
court could not perform both functions in a single capacity. 
The superior court acting as such had no power to vacate 
the order of commitment; the juvenile court had no power 
to impose, a criminal sentence. , (In re Hulbert, i2,3 Qal.App. 
362 [11 P.2d 50]; WeIf. & Inst. Code, §§ 734; 740; seePe(Jple, 
v. Superio~ Court, supra; et.WeH. & Inst. Code, § 702.) 
.Its proceedmgs are not penal (see cases cited in 14 Cal.J-ur. 
138, § 26, arid 6 Cal.Jur: 10-Yr. Slipp. 461) arid' its order 
adjudging a person a ward of the court is not a conviction of' 
crime. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 736.) The judgment imposing 
,sentence upon defendant could therefore be rendered only 
by the superior court acting under the general lIiw while 
the o~der vacating his commitment could be made by the 
,superIor co uri only when functioning as a juvenile court. 
The judgment is therefore void, and the order denying 
defendant's motion to set aside and vacate the judgment is 
, reversed. 
Curtis, J., Edmonds, J., and Carter, J., concurred. 
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SPENCE, J, pro tem.-i dissent. !fit be ,assumed that, 
there were any irregularities under the JuveJ;lile CoUrt Law: 
in the proceedings leading up to the, judgttlent sentencing' 
the defendant' to San Quentin,fo~,rob"jjery in' the first-degree: 
such irregularities did not affect the jurisdiction of, the, 
superior court to enter said judgJii~t. (In r6 wolff" :183 
Cal. 602 [192 P. 33] ; People' v;'Barbera,,'7,8CaLApp. 277' 
[248 P. 304] ; In re Tassey, 81 Cal..App. 287 [253 P. 948}.) 
Defendant raised no objection whatever during aJiY' of the 
proceedings leading up to the jridg:i:i1ent and took ,no appeal 
from the judgment. In my opinlon, the order denying the, 
motion to set aside the judgment,which motion was made long' 
after the judgmeilthad become final, should be af'iirmed. 
Shenk, J., concurred. 
[Sac. No. 5512. In Bank. Jan. 12, 1943.] 
DAVID E. MILLER, as Executor, etc., Respondent, v. ROB-





Deeds----Actions-Presumptions .-; Delive17- Time ofo-:--When 
read with Civ. Code, § 1054, and Code Civ. Proe.,§ :\,933, Oiv., 
Code,' § 1055, means that a, duly signed and delivered deed is 
presumed to' have been delivered at its date. 
Id.-Delivery.-The mere signing, witnessing and acknowledg-
ing of a deed are not sufficient to divest the grantor of title. 
Delivery is essential.' ' 
Id._Actions----Presumptions----Delivery-PossessioD. of Deed~­
The grantee's possession of a ,deed gives rise to, ali inferenoe 
of due delivery. ' " 
Id._Actions----Evidence-Delive17.-Evidenoe that. a .signed, 
witnessed and acknowledged deed was found in the safety, 
deposit box of a deceased gTantor, together with other papers 
disclosing an attempt to save the expense of probate, sup-
ports a finding of nondelivery. :, 
'[1] See 9 Oal.Jur., 193 ;16 Am.Jur. 657~ ,- ' 
McK. Dig. References: [1] Deeds, § 168(1); [2] Deeds, § 58; [3] 
Deeds, § 168(3); [4] Deeds, § 183(2). 
. ,",".-
'.'. +. 
